June 1999
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June 1999 |
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Classifieds
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Social Host Liability in Minnesota
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Will you be hosting a company picnic, graduation party or Independence Day celebration this summer at which alcoholic beverages will be made available to your guests? If so, have you considered your potential liability to a person who is injured by one of your intoxicated party attendees, or to your intoxicated party guest who injures him or herself? Do you know if your liability varies depending on whether the intoxicated individual is a minor or an adult? Would you expect liability to depend upon whether you collected or charged a fee for the alcohol you served at your party? If you are confused by the foregoing questions you are not alone. Since the Minnesota Legislature amended the Civil Damages Act in 1990, Minnesota courts have struggled with the issue of social host liability. This article will review the history of social host liability in Minnesota, including the recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision of Koehnen v. Dufour,1 and will provide a brief summary and analysis of the published and unpublished appellate court opinions that have addressed the issue of common law liability since the 1990 legislative amendment to the Civil Damages Act.
In Koehnen v. Dufour, appellant Koehnen brought an action against Rachel Paul, under the Civil Damages Act, Minn. Stat. §340A.801, subd. 1, claiming that she illegally sold alcohol to underage individuals who later injured Koehnen. The district court granted Paul’s motion for summary judgment and was affirmed when the appellate court concluded that Paul could not be held liable as a social host under the Civil Damages Act, since the statute applied only to commercial vendors of liquor. On June 17, 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the Civil Damages Act applies to a social host who charged guests a nominal fee for the alcohol served at a party. In Koehnen, 17-year-old Rachel Paul hosted a party at her father’s house where she charged $2 to $4 for a glass to be used to drink beer from a keg. Three people at Paul’s party became intoxicated, left her party, and struck Koehnen outside his sister’s home, causing him serious injury. Appellant Koehnen brought suit claiming that he had a cause of action under the Civil Damages Act because Paul illegally sold alcohol to the person who injured him. Specifically, appellant argued that liability attached under the plain language of subdivision 1 to "a person," like Paul, who "illegally sell[s]" alcohol. On March 11, 1999, the Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that a social host is immune from liability under the Civil Damages Act. Relying on the 1982 Cady decision, the Court ruled that the Civil Damages Act applied only to commercial vendors of alcoholic beverages.2 During the 17 years that the Cady decision has been the law in Minnesota, the Legislature has amended the Civil Damages Act without extending liability to social hosts, regardless of whether hosts received consideration for the alcohol served. Despite the long-standing preemption precedent, three justices dissented, opining that the status of host is lost if consideration is given in return for the alcoholic drinks served at a social gathering. However, as the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly noted in Koehnen, expansion of social host liability may only occur by legislative amendment. |
Stacy E. Cudd is 1996 cum laude graduate of William Mitchell College of Law. She is an associate at the St. Paul law firm of Murnane, Conlin, White & Brandt, practicing primarily in the area of insurance defense. |
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History The dissent in the Koehnen decision apparently sought a return to the 1972 Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Ross v. Ross, which held that the Civil Damages Act applied to social hosts.3 At that time, however, the act created a cause of action against any person or persons not in the business of selling or distributing liquor, i.e., social hosts, who illegally gave or sold liquor to another person causing intoxication that resulted in damage to the plaintiff. In 1977, the Legislature amended the act by removing the words "or giving," thereby ensuring that the act applied only to commercial vendors of intoxicating beverages. The Koehnen Court’s recent decision recognized that social hosts have uniformly been exempt from liability under either the Civil Damages Act or common law for illegally furnishing alcohol since 1977.4 For example, in the 1983 case of Walker v. Kennedy, the decedent died when his snowmobile ran into a car that was left stranded in a ditch by a minor who had been drinking at a party held at the defendant’s home.5 The minor, who drove his car into the ditch, brought the alcohol he had been drinking to the party himself. A social host liability claim was asserted against the defendant who was away on vacation at the time his 16-year-old daughter hosted a party at the defendant’s home. In Walker, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not decide the issue of social host liability because "[a]n essential element for social host liability is that the guest is ‘given or furnished’ alcoholic beverages by the person from whom recovery is sought."6 Since the minor brought his own liquor to the party, Defendant did not furnish alcohol within the meaning of the act, and therefore was not liable as a social host. Two years later, in Holmquist v. Miller, the Court ruled that a social host is not liable in a common law action for serving alcohol to a minor.7 In Holmquist, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted the strong public policy of discouraging the illegal furnishing of alcohol to minors, but rejected common law liability claims based upon the strong precedent in Minnesota indicating that social host liability was preempted by the Legislature, and noting that only the Legislature could create social host liability in furtherance of that policy.8 The Legislature, apparently responding to the Supreme Court’s invitation, amended the Civil Damages Act in 1990 by enacting subdivision 6. In summary, Minnesota courts have consistently concluded that liability under the Civil Damages Act is limited to commercial vendors or distributors of liquor, thereby precluding claims against social hosts under the Civil Damages Act. In 1990, however, the Legislature created a limited window of opportunity for the imposition of common law social host liability.
In 1990, the Legislature amended the Civil Damages Act by adding subdivision 6, which provides as follows:
As a result of this amendment, the Minnesota Legislature provided a window of opportunity for injured parties to pursue common law liability claims that had previously been denied by a long line of Minnesota Supreme Court decisions.10 In 1995, for the first time since the 1990 legislative amendment, the Minnesota Court of Appeals was asked to address the issue of whether social hosts age 21 or older are absolutely liable for injuries caused by illegally furnishing alcohol to a person under age 21.11 In Van Wagner v. Mattison, a plaintiff utilized §340A.801, subd. 6, in order to bring a common law tort claim for injuries he sustained against the social host who furnished him with alcohol. According to the plaintiff, the fact that he was an intoxicated person did not bar his common law claim, as it ordinarily would under the Civil Damages Act. The court concluded that by enacting Minn. Stat. §340A.801, subd. 6, the Legislature signaled its intent that the act not preempt claims against social hosts who have knowingly furnished alcohol to persons under age 21, as long as the hosts are at least 21 years old. In concluding that the plaintiff had a claim against the social host, the Van Wagner court noted that "[h]ad the Legislature intended to bar a claim brought by the intoxicated person, it could have done so explicitly, as it did for actions under subd. 1 of the act." The Van Wagner court also made clear that the limited common law actions permitted against social hosts under subdivision 6 are subject to comparative fault.12 Despite the apparently clear legislative intent in enacting subdivision 6 and the Van Wagner holding, several unpublished appellate court decisions have analyzed various factual scenarios seeking to impose common law liability on social hosts, but have all unanimously decided to insulate the social host. |
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Unpublished Appellate Opinions Two unpublished appellate opinions have recognized the validity of limited common law actions against social hosts, but have declined to impose such liability based on the fact that the defendant did not knowingly provide or furnish alcohol to minors. For example, in Opay v. Howard Lake Liquor Store, Sonya Opay’s parents brought a wrongful death action against Connie and Frederick Krause after their 18-year-old daughter was found dead as a result of being asphyxiated by carbon monoxide in Rodney Jones garage.13 Sonya Opay had been drinking beer with friends at an abandoned farm house on property owned by Connie Krause. Connie Krause’s 20-year-old son hosted these parties. Even though Opay and her friend, Nicole Jones, were intoxicated when they left the party, Nicole Jones drove her friends to the Jones’ home where they would all spend the night. On the ride home, Opay passed out in the front seat of the car. Jones parked the car, closed the garage and left the keys in the ignition, as was the family custom. Opay indicated that she wanted to stay in the car. Opay was found unconscious in the front passenger seat of the car the next morning after the Jones realized that the car was running in the closed garage. The cause of action Opay’s parents asserted under the Civil Damages Act, Minn. Stat. §340A.801, subd. 1, did not apply to the facts of this case because there was no evidence that anyone at the Krause house sold alcoholic beverages to Opay or her friends. Obviously, this rationale is no longer valid, in light of the Koehnen decision, which clarifies that a social host is insulated from liability under subdivision 1, even if they sell intoxicating liquor. The wrongful death action against Frederick Krause was also dismissed because he did not meet the statutory age requirement necessary to maintain a common law social host cause of action.14 Accordingly, the only remaining theory of recovery possible, Minn. Stat. §340A.801, subd. 6, would require Opay’s parents to prove that Connie Krause knowingly provided or furnished alcoholic beverages to Opay. The Opay court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Connie Krause based on the fact that Opav’s parents failed to establish that Connie Krause ‘knowingly" provided or furnished alcoholic beverages to Opay, a minor. The court reasoned that Krause was not present at the abandoned farm house, she did not pay for any of the liquor purchased for the party, she did not know there was a party on her property, and she never met Opay or her friend on the evening of the party, and therefore, a common law social host cause of action against Connie Krause could not be maintained since she did not knowingly provide or furnish alcohol to Opay. One year later, in Frisch v. Bassett, 18-year-old Shawn Kuhlman asked his father, Lawrence, if he could have a party at the family home.15 Kristine Bassett, a minor, drank at the party; later, when she drove home drunk, she collided head-on with a car driven by Joanna Armendariz, killing both of them in the collision. Armendariz’s mother sued the parents of Shawn Kuhlman because that was the place where Bassett had been drinking. The district court granted the Kuhlman’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that "[t]here is no evidence to suggest the Defendants Kuhlman illegally served or knowingly provided alcoholic beverages to Decedent." Appellant argued that the Kuhlmans "furnished" alcohol by allowing it to be consumed on their property, even though they did not personally serve, sell or give the alcohol to the minors. Appellant further claimed that the Kuhlmans "provided" alcohol by (1) authorizing a party at their home where they knew minors would consume alcohol, (2) not terminating the party where alcohol was being consumed by minors, and (3) not taking the alcohol away from the minors. The appellate court disagreed, concluding that the Kuhlmans did not provide or furnish alcohol to minors within the meaning of Minn. Stat. §340A.801, subd. 6, by merely authorizing a party at their home where they knew minors would consume alcohol, or by not taking the alcoholic beverages away from the minors, or by failing to stop the party at which alcohol was being consumed by underage drinkers. The Frisch court also declined to allow appellant to amend her complaint to add a negligent supervision cause of action because that claim did not fall squarely within the language of subdivision 6, and was therefore preempted by the Civil Damages Act. The other unpublished appellate opinion addressing the issue of common law social host liability involved a claim against a minor who sold, provided or furnished alcoholic beverages to other minors. In that case, the appellate court declined to impose social host liability on the minor who sold, provided or furnished liquor to other underage drinkers on the grounds that such claims do not fall within the plain language of subdivision 6. In Siltman v. Tulenchik,16 appellants brought a personal injury action against respondents, Tulenchik and Sheldon, claiming that they furnished alcohol to a minor in violation of the Civil Damages Act. Sheldon moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that "no cause of action existed against him either under statute or at common law because he was only 19 years old at the time of the incident." The district court granted Sheldon’s motion, and the appellate court affirmed noting that "the Civil Damages Act gives a plaintiff injured by an intoxicated person a cause of action against anyone furnishing alcohol to that intoxicated person."17 In discussing the Civil Damages Act, the appellate court noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted subdivision 1 of the act as allowing actions only against persons in the business of providing liquor or commercial vendors. As such, the Siltman court recognized that there was no cause of action against social hosts under subdivision 1, even against those who may receive consideration for the liquor or those who furnish alcohol to minors, because the Civil Damages Act preempts any common law negligence action against a social host. Based upon the numerous dram shop cases that discuss preemption, the appellate court in Siltman ruled that Sheldon could not be held liable for furnishing or selling alcohol to a minor. Despite the nearly 20 years of preemption precedent, appellants nonetheless argued that a cause of action against Sheldon existed under subdivision 6 because the Legislature intended subdivision 1 to allow actions to be maintained against all natural persons regardless of whether or not they are commercial vendors or distributors of liquor. The appellate court disagreed with this argument for several reasons, including (1) the Legislature did not change or otherwise amend subdivision 1 of the act; (2) the plain language of subdivisions 1 and 6 does not support such an interpretation; and (3) years of case law interprets subdivision I of the Civil Damages Act as allowing a cause of action only against commercial vendors. Accordingly, the Siltman court dismissed appellant’s complaint against Sheldon based on the fact that "the act preempts any cause of action against a social host for negligently furnishing alcohol to a minor," and concluded that the Legislature did not intend to create a separate cause of action against persons under 21 when it enacted subdivision 6. |
"It is not enough that a person over the age of 21 knows of a party taking place at which minors are consuming alcoholic beverages, nor will social host liability be imposed against an adult who simply authorizes a party for minors." |
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Analysis To date, the appellate court decisions indicate that the common law social host liability made possible by subdivision 6 will be applied in very limited situations only. In order to assert a common law social host liability cause of action in Minnesota, a potential defendant must be (1) more than 21 years of age, (2) who knowingly, (3) provided or furnished, (4) alcohol, (5) to a person under the age of 21. It is not enough that a person over the age of 21 knows of a party taking place at which minors are consuming alcoholic beverages, nor will social host liability be imposed against an adult who simply authorizes a party for minors. Instead, imposition of social host liability requires that the social host knowingly provides or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a minor. Although the appellate court has not yet explicitly defined "knowingly provides or furnishes," it would appear that some type of active participation by the person over the age of 21 is required to satisfy the strictures of subdivision 6. Knowingly providing or furnishing alcohol may be satisfied by simply purchasing alcohol intended for underage drinkers. On the other hand, paying for the liquor, as well as being present at a party and personally supervising the serving of alcohol to persons under the age of 21, or some combination thereof, may satisfy the "knowingly provide or furnish" element of subdivision 6. In addition, a person over the age of 2l must know that the alcohol is being provided or furnished to persons under 21 years of age. It is not enough that the person over 21 should have known that underage drinkers were consuming the alcohol.
The March 11, 1999 Supreme Court decision in Koehnen v. Dufour reaffirms nearly 20 years of uniform case law interpreting the Civil Damages Act, Minn. Stat. §340A.801, subd. 1, as insulating social hosts from liability. Unless the Legislature revisits the act, it is clear that a claim against a social host is preempted, even if a nominal fee is collected for the alcohol that is being served or provided, because the Civil Damages Act applies only to commercial vendors or distributors of intoxicating liquor. Under the common law, Minn. Stat. §340A.801, subd. 6, a cause of action may only be asserted against a social host who is over the age of 21 and who knowingly provides or furnishes alcohol to an individual who is under the age of 21. In those limited situations, a social host may be liable to a third person injured by an intoxicated person or to the intoxicated person himself. Commentators have suggested that subdivision
6 does not require the imposition of social host liability in even those
very limited circumstances.18 However, the
Legislature and the Minnesota Supreme Court both recognize the strong
public policy of discouraging persons from providing or furnishing minors
with alcoholic beverages. While some may argue that subdivision 6 is not
mandatory, it seems clear that the Minnesota judicial system recognizes
the scourge of underage drinking and driving on society. The courts will
likely welcome the opportunity to curtail the economic toll incurred by
those injured by underage drinkers by allowing a very limited common law
action to be maintained against social hosts who violate the provisions
of subdivision 6.
1 Koehnen v. Dufour, 1998 WL 188865 at *1 (Minn. App. 1998) (unpublished opinion), review granted, (Jun. 17, 1998), affirmed, (Minn. March 11, 1999). (Back to text) 2. Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1982). (Back) 3 Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972). (Back) 4 See Cole v. Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836, 840 (Minn. 1982); Cady, 315 N.W.2d at 595 (Minn. 1982. (Back) 5 Walker v. Kennedy, 338 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1983). (Back) 6 Id. at 255. (Back) 7 Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468, 470-72 (Minn. 1985). (Back) 8 Id. at 470-72; see also Meany v. Newell, 367 N.W.2d 472, 473-75 (Minn. 1985), Stevens v. Thielen, 394 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. App. 1986). (Back) 9 Minn. Stat. §340A.801, subd. 6 (1998). (Back) 10 4 Minnesota Practice civjig 459 (Supp. 1996). (Back) 11 Van Wagner v. Mattison, 533 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn. App. 1995). (Back) 12 Id. at 80. (Back) 13 Opay v. Howard Lake Liquor Store, 1995 WL 34838 at *1 (Minn. App. 1995) (unpublished opinion), rev'd in part on other grounds, 531 N.W.2d 845 (Minn. 1995). (Back) 14 Id. at fn.1. (Back) 15 Frisch v. Bassett, 1996 WL 104770 at *1 (Minn. App. 1996) (unpublished opinion). (Back) 16 Slltman v. Tulenchik, 1995 WL 6426 at *1 (Minn. App. 1995) (unpublished opinion). (Back) 17 Id., citing Minn. Stat. §340A.801, subd. 1(1990). (Back) 18 See Michael K. Steenson, "With the Legislatures's permission and the Supreme Court's consent, common law social host liability returns to Minnesota," 21 William Mitchell Law Review 45 (1995). (Back)
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