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Rink Rulings
A series of rulings over the past few years have involved
liability claims relating to ice rinks used for hockey. In Doyle
v. City of Roseville, 524 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1994), a woman
who slipped and fell on an icy parking lot outside an ice rink
after a high school hockey game had her case against the city
that owned the facility dismissed on grounds that it had no common-law
duty to safely maintain the parking lot. The woman, who had been
honored at a between-periods ceremony as a parent of a senior
cheerleader at the high school game, slipped on a smooth "layer
of glare ice that developed from melting snow during the game."
Citing an "unbroken" line of cases stretching back
over a century, the court noted that a municipality is not "liable
for injuries sustained in a fall on newly formed glare ice,"
provided that the governmental unit does not negligently permit
ice and snow to accumulate or remain on public premises for such
a period of time that slippery and dangerous "irregularities
develop there." Known as the "mere slipperiness rule,"
this common law doctrine transcends the codification of municipal
immunities set forth in Minn. Stat. ¤ 466.03, subd. 4,
which bars claims based on "snow or ice conditions under
any highway or other public place, except where the condition
is affirmatively caused by the negligent acts of the municipality."
Although the woman suffered an "unfortunate tumble,"
the ice had not remained there "long enough" to form
irregularities upon which municipal liability may be grounded.
Therefore, the common law "mere slipperiness" doctrine
precluded liability as a matter of law, without regard to the
immunity statute.
Another immunity statute, the recreational provision in Minn.
Stat. ¤ 466.03, subd. 6(e) was invoked to preclude a lawsuit
by another injured rink claimant in Nelson v. City of Roseau,
1998 WL 147858 (Minn. App. 1998) (unpublished). The claimant
hit his head on a door from the locker room to the rink, cracking
a vertebra, as he was about to coach a hockey team at a municipal
ice arena. The recreational immunity statute precludes liability
against a municipality for any claim based on "construction,
operation, or maintenance of any property that is intended or
permitted to be used as a park, as an open area for recreational
purposes, or the provision of recreational services, . . .."
The coach's injury fell within the "broad statutory immunity"
since the ice rink was owned and operated by a municipality and
the claim arose from the construction and maintenance of the
property. The exception to recreational immunity did not apply
because any "dangerous condition . . . was plainly visible
and known" to the coach, as he had previously been through
the door about ten times since it had been renovated and the
configuration of the steps had been changed, including a mere
15 minutes before the incident in question.
The recreational immunity statute also precluded liability for
a young girl who slipped and fell and impaled her leg on a metal
post fixed to the outside of a municipal hockey rink as she sat
on the boards surrounding the rink taking a break from walking
her dog. In Noble v. City of Eagan, 1996 WL 162617
(Minn. App. 1996) (unpublished), the appellate court held that
the recreational immunity applied, and the exception was not
established because the city was unaware and did not have reason
to know that the metal bracket constituted an "unreasonable
risk of death or serious injury since there had been no prior
incidents, complaints, or comments about potential safety hazards."
The possibility of falling while climbing on the sideboards was
an "obvious danger" that the 11-year-old child "should
have understood" which precludes application of the exception
to the recreational immunity provision.
A hockey player who suffered lung injuries because of exposure
to nitrogen dioxide at a municipally owned ice arena was entitled
to recover damages based upon the city's admitted negligence
in operating and maintaining the facility. Anderson v. City
of Coon Rapids, 1995 WL 238770 (Minn. App. 1995) (unpublished).
The Court of Appeals overturned a determination by the Anoka
County District Court that there was insufficient proof of causation
between the poisonous air and the pulmonary problems. Although
the expert witness's testimony did not link the aggravation of
the hockey player's preexisting medical condition to the air
quality with "absolute certainty," it was sufficient
to justify the jury's verdict. Therefore, the trial court erred
in overturning the verdict based on the issue of causation, and
the hockey player was entitled to the damages awarded by the
jury.
Some hockey-related injuries take place away from the rink, as
reflected in Reed v. University of North Dakota, 543 N.W.2d
106 (Minn. App. 1996). A hockey player from Minnesota who was
playing college hockey at the University of North Dakota was
injured while participating in a charity race as part of the
school's preseason conditioning program. He sued the university
for negligent breach of contract in Minnesota, but the Itasca
County District Court threw the case out on jurisdictional grounds.
The appellate court affirmed, but on other grounds. It ruled
that North Dakota law, rather than Minnesota law, applies to
the action based upon the five-step analysis for choice of law.
Applying the doctrine of comity, which is intended to respect
"another state's sovereign immunity," the court concluded
that exercise of jurisdiction by Minnesota courts would present
"an affront" to the sovereignty of North Dakota. Accordingly,
the negligence claim could not be pursued. The breach of contract
claim also was not actionable because the injured player did
not identify any breach of a specific contractual provision,
nor any obligation by the university "to protect the health
of their athletes."
Equipment Excesses
Hockey players wear and use an excessive amount of equipment
compared to participants in nearly any other sport. Their accouterments
often lead to litigation.
But Minnesota hockey players who became ill as a result of nitrogen
dioxide emitted from a "Zamboni" machine that resurfaced
ice before the games and between periods at a pair of hockey
games in Idaho were not entitled to pursue their claims in Minnesota.
In Brockman v. Sun Valley Resorts, Inc., 923 F.Supp. 1176
(D. Minn. 1996), the Federal District Court in Minnesota granted
a motion by the out-of-state defendants to transfer the case
to Idaho under the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. ¤
1404(a).
Although a court must "strongly weigh" plaintiff's
choice to sue in Minnesota, a variety of factors warranted transferring
venue to Idaho, where there would be "greater ease of access
to the sources of proof, and . . . the only venue which would
permit even the possibility of view of the premises." Although
the case could be more conveniently tried in Idaho than in Minnesota,
the relative inconveniences were not "sufficiently strong"
to justify transfer. The tipping point, however, was the "novelty"
of the underlying legal issue, the reasonable standard of air
quality and ventilation in indoor arenas in Idaho, which the
Minnesota trial judge, Paul Magnuson, felt should be determined
by a court "sitting in Idaho, not Minnesota." Because
a judge and jury in Idaho are "in a better position to provide
and apply the standard" to determine air quality of the
Idaho facility, the court upheld a request to have the case heard
in that jurisdiction.
A merger between two rivals in marketing equipment for hockey
rinks led to a legal donnybrook in Rink Systems, Inc. v. Arena
Systems, Inc., 1999 WL 1138511 (Minn. App. 1999).
After disputes developed, one of the participants broke away
and established its own competitive business, taking over the
name, equipment, employees, accounts, and other assets of the
joint enterprise. The other party sued on a variety of statutory
and tort claims and obtained a judgment in excess of $207,000
from Freeborn County District Court, which the Minnesota Court
of Appeals affirmed. The court upheld the determination by the
trial court that the spin-off entity had diverted nearly $200,000
into a "covert bank account," which breached various
statutory and common law duties between the members of the merged
entity.
The federal judicial court in Minnesota enjoined the misappropriation
of the name of a star hockey player, Mark Messier, on hockey
sticks in Hillerich & Bradsbury Co. v. Christian Brothers,
Inc., 943 F.Supp. 1136 (D. Minn. 1996). A hockey equipment
manufacturer had an exclusive endorsement agreement with the
star hockey center to use his name on hockey equipment, but a
competitor put the player's name on hockey sticks. The holder
of the exclusivity arrangement sued for unfair trade practices
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. ¤ 1125(a)(1), which prohibits
unfair trade practices, along with misappropriation of publicity
rights, deceptive practices under Minn. Stat. ¤ 325D.44,
and other torts. The competitor defended by claiming that it
used the puckster's name only to let customers know that its
blades are the "same shape" as used by the hockey star.
U.S. District Court Judge John Tunheim ruled in favor of the
holder of the exclusive endorsement contract with Messier, rejecting
the competitor's claim that it was entitled under the "Fair
Use" doctrine to affix the player's name as a "descriptive
term for the curve of the blade" of the hockey stick. The
court imposed injunctive relief barring the competitor from using
Messier's name on its sticks, finding that doing so could mislead
customers that Messier "has endorsed" the competitor's
equipment or that "he has some connection" with it.
The use of Messier's name "without permission" also
constitutes a violation of his right of publicity, which also
is actionable and justifies injunctive relief to protect "the
public from confusion or deception." |
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