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The legal maneuvering in Florida following the recent presidential election is now over. But it was not unique to the Sunshine State. While less exotic than brouhahas over the Butterfly Ballot, dimpled chads, and other irregularities, electoral disputes have been played out -- albeit in less grandiose ways -- in Minnesota courts over the years, including the recent presidential election. Judicial decisions have played a key role in the election of two of the past eight governors in this state, dating back to 1962 when another governor had to overcome a legal challenge in order to maintain his position. Thus, during that span, three out of eight gubernatorial elections, nearly 40 percent, involved court decisions, both before and after the voters spoke.

These cases highlight the history of litigious electoral jurisprudence in Minnesota. Courts in this state have been called upon to sort out a variety of electoral issues, ranging from last-minute placement of candidates on ballots to challenges to the way candidates are identified and votes are cast.

Although hardly as celebrated as the legal jousts in Florida, Minnesota had its own taste of presidential politics litigation following the recent campaign. The little-noticed case had some of the same features as the historic Florida litigation, but was not as hysterical. It involved issues of "intent," the decision-making authority of the secretary of state; the placement of the name of the Reform Party candidate Pat Buchanan on the ballot; and a divided Supreme Court ruling after the election. Shades of dimpled chads, Florida's Kathryn Harris, the Butterfly Ballot, and Bush v. Gore.

In Scofield v. Kiffmeyer, 2000 WL 18635186 (Minn. Dec. 21, 2000), the Supreme Court, by a 6-1 vote, upheld the decision by Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer to allow John Hagelin and his running mate to appear on the ballot as the nominees of the national Reform Party, while Buchanan and his vice presidential candidate were designated as representing the "Reform Party -- Minnesota." The dispute grew out of the internecine battle within the Reform Party and its Minnesota auxiliary.

The Court, rejecting a challenge by the Buchanan forces, stated that the "intent" of those who signed nominating petitions should control and brushed aside concerns over "confusion." The potential for misunderstanding, said the Court, "does not outweigh" the desire to carry out the "intent" of those who signed the petition for the Hagelin team. The decision was announced before the election, but not formally issued in writing until six weeks afterward.

In dissent, Justice Alan Page was dismayed by the "confusion" caused by the ballot designations coupled with the endorsement of the Hagelin ticket by another group, the Natural Law Party.

The controversy may have been much sound and plenty of fury of little long-lasting nature. Al Gore won in Minnesota, George W. Bush won the presidency, and the Reform Party will have to try to patch up its feud if it is to be a player in the electoral scene in the future.

Marshall H. Tanick is an attorney with the law firm of Mansfield, Tanick & Cohen, P.A. in Minneapolis and St. Paul. He is certified as a Civil Trial Specialist by the Minnesota State Bar Association and has represented parties in a number of election-related matters.

In 1975, a single contested absentee ballot was ruled valid by the courts -- affirming a one-vote margin for a township supervisor in Washington County.

Gaffes in the process of electing governors have provided fodder for a trio of Minnesota election cases.

In 1962, DFL'er Karl Rolvaag became the last Minnesota governor elected to a two-year term, ousting Republican incumbent Elmer Andersen, by 91 votes, after a four-month long recount that was punctuated by legal proceedings. The victory for Rolvaag, who served as lieutenant governor in the Andersen administration, was aided by a ruling of the state Supreme Court in In Re Application of Andersen, 264 Minn. 257, 119 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1962).

The original tabulation of ballots showed Rolvaag leading by 58 votes. Both candidates sought to challenge a number of irregularities, including localities where more votes were counted than registered voters existed, miscues with absentee ballots, dubious votes for a marginal third-party candidate, and a host of other improprieties that the Supreme Court characterized as "of a nature that could reasonably be said to be obvious errors." While that term "defied exact definition," it permitted correction of the mistakes.

The Court tried to reconcile a number of conflicting statutes to ascertain the "expression of the will of the voters that the law seeks." The outcome was that the State Canvassing Board, which certifies election results, was required to accept amended returns from a number of counties "even though some technical irregularities" existed in the manner in which the votes were counted. The Court observed that there is "hardly an election in which some irregularities do not occur, and the technical mistakes should not overcome the will of the electors." The directive to accept all amended returns led to the famous recount, which resulted in Rolvaag's victory by 91 votes.

The 1962 election of Rolvaag was notable for two other reasons. Not only did it give way to four-year terms thereafter, but it was also the last time that governors and lieutenant governors ran on a ticket from their respective parties.

The issue of gubernatorial running mates was at the center of the next gubernatorial election case before the Supreme Court a generation later. In Clark v. Growe, 461 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1990), the Independent-Republican party's nominee for governor, John Grunseth, who won the party primary over State Auditor Arne Carlson, withdrew from the race in the waning days of the campaign because of a scandal regarding alleged salacious behavior with teenage girls. Carlson was placed on the ballot as the party's designee. But Sharon Clark, Grunseth's running mate, sought to remain on the ballot as the Independent-Republican candidate for lieutenant governor, contending that as the victor in the primary, she belonged on the ballot despite Grunseth's exit from the race.

The Supreme Court rejected her contention, ordering that Carlson's chosen running mate, Joanell Dyrstad, was the appropriate lieutenant governor candidate. A dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Peter Popovich criticized the majority opinion for ignoring the "intent of the voters" who selected the Grunseth-Clark "team" in the party primary.

The decision to allow the Carlson "team" to be placed on the ballot as the Republican candidates was profound. They defeated the incumbent DFL'ers, beginning the first of two four-year terms for Carlson.

Third-party candidates often have to fight legal battles to appear on the ballot. But Jesse Ventura, as a third-party candidate, had no such trouble qualifying for the ballot since his then-denominated Reform party had obtained major party status. However, he had to fend off a post-election challenge in Savior v. Ventura, 1999 Minn. LEXIS 217 (Minn. 1999). The challenger, a perennial candidate who also ran for the U.S. Senate and lost this past election, challenged Ventura's election as governor on the grounds that his campaign violated the Fair Campaign Practices Act, Minn. Stat. Ch. 211B, by paying the filing fee for a candidate who ran in the primary as a Republican. The claimant contended that the erstwhile Republican candidate previously sought to run as a Reform Party candidate, and his switching to the Republican primary benefited Ventura "by removing his only opponent" in his party's primary.

The Court held that the challenge was untimely and did not comply with the statutory limit on time periods for contesting elections. It concluded, "absent strict compliance with the statutory requirements, the courts are powerless to entertain such contests or appeals therefrom." The procedure also was flawed because the act requires that any election contest for statewide office must be heard in Ramsey County District Court, which triggers notification to the chief justice of the Supreme Court, who is to appoint three judges to determine the case. The Court noted that the process was not followed in this case, but entertained the case anyway in the "interests of justice."

Candidates for judicial offices in Minnesota also have had their share of electoral litigation jousts. A pair of them occurred in 1992. One was brought against Gov. Carlson, claiming that he prevented a candidate from appearing on the ballot, while the other was directed to the "incumbent" designation on the ballot for judges seeking reelection.

In Page v. Carlson, 488 N.W. 2d 274 (Minn. 1992), a Supreme Court justice was up for reelection in 1992, two years before he reached the mandatory retirement age of 70. Gov. Carlson extended his term, pursuant to a statute that allows extension of a judicial term for up to three years in order to qualify the incumbent for full retirement benefits. The extension eliminated an election for the position, which was sought by Alan Page, who sued after the secretary of state refused to place his name on the ballot for the position.

Hearing the matter under its original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court concluded that the term-extension statute did not apply because the state constitution provides an extension of a judge's term can be granted only when it is necessary to permit the judge to serve for the minimum number of years to become eligible for a pension, and that the sitting judge already had met that requirement. Since the constitution prohibits a term extension "to permit a judge to maximize or enhance a pension for which the judge is already eligible," the extension could not be utilized to "avoid an election." Accordingly, the secretary of state was directed to allow Page to appear on the ballot. Like Carlson before him, he won and was later reelected. But see Diemer v. Carlson, 530 N.W. 875 (Minn. 1996) (upholding power of governor to appoint replacement to fill vacancy resulting from retirement of judge four months before expiration of judge's term.)

Another aspirant for the Supreme Court in the same year challenged the use on the ballot of the term "incumbent," as mandated by Minn. Stat. ¤ 204B.36 subd. 5, to designate sitting judges seeking reelection. The Court upheld the incumbency designation in Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W. 2d 418 (Minn. 1992), ruling that the designation was rational even though it results in not treating "all candidates with absolute equality."

Under the statute, enacted in 1949, only sitting judges are identified as "incumbent," an appellation not accorded candidates for any other offices. The Court reviewed the history of judicial elections in Minnesota, noting the inherent "tension in the judicial election process." The Court found that the history of judicial elections in the state, which are nonpartisan, supported treating judges differently from "the traditional partisan candidates," including the "distinctive" use of the "incumbent" term. While the terminology may give an "advantage to sitting judges," it is lawful. The incumbency designation aims to "assure an able, independent and stable judiciary" by a process that "informs a voter who the incumbent candidate is and who the challenger is." Viewing the "incumbent" declaration on the ballot as a "benefit" for the voters "not the candidate," the Court concluded that the designation did not offend Equal Protection under either the federal or state constitutions.

A post-election challenge by an unsuccessful judicial candidate in the 7th Judicial District was turned aside by the appellate court in Burns v. Balen, 400 N.W. 2d 126 (Minn. App. 1987). The candidate, who lost "by several thousand votes," predicated the challenge on alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, including misleading statements in political advertisements regarding the candidate's level of support by members of the local bar association, and displaying the candidate's literature at the courthouse. The Court held that violations of the judicial code are not justiciable because election challenges can be decided only on the basis of statutory election law. The statements about local bar support were "not falsely misleading." The display of campaign literature at the county courthouse also was not improper because public employees under compulsion did not do it. Accordingly, none of the challenges was sustained and the election result was upheld.

A 1984 aspirant for Congress sought to be identified on the ballot with the middle name of "Pro Life." Minnesota law allows only a "legal name or nickname by which the candidate is generally and commonly known."

"The fusion-candidacy law was invoked in 1997 to prohibit a candidate from the state Legislature from being listed on the ballot as both a DFL'er, his party, and for the neophyte New Party."

Like the Bush-Gore clash, Minnesota electoral cases have even reached the highest pinnacle in the judicial process: the U.S. Supreme Court. In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), the Court affirmed a decision of Judge Michael Davis upholding the Minnesota law prohibiting candidates from appearing on the ballot as a candidate of more than one party. The measure, Minn. Stat. ¤ 204B.06 subds. 1 (b) and 2, known as the fusion-candidacy law, was invoked to prohibit a candidate from the state Legislature, Sen. Andy Dawkins, from being listed on the ballot both as a DFL'er, his party, and for the neophyte New Party. The Court held that Minnesota, similar to about 40 other states, may proscribe multiple endorsements as a means "to reduce election- and campaign-related disorder." It rejected the contention that the prohibition violates the 1st Amendment rights of minor parties, reasoning that allowing candidates for office to run for more than one party "would undermine the ballot's purpose by transforming it from a means of choosing candidates to a bill board for political advertising."

Where candidates appear on the ballot, rather than how they are designated, was at issue in Mattson v. McKenna, 301 Minn. 103, 222 N.W. 2d 273 (1974). A candidate for state auditor challenged ballots to be used in an upcoming DFL primary because his name did not appear on the same line as the incumbent and party-endorsed candidates, whose names were arranged alphabetically on the ballots, while his opponent's name always appeared on their line, regardless how the names were rotated. Although Minn. Stat. ¤ 203.30 precludes placing names on a ballot in a way that advantages one candidate over the other, the state Supreme Court concluded that placement on the same line with incumbents or endorsed candidates did not necessarily favor one candidate over the other in the "current political situation in Minnesota."

The Court noted that incumbents "are not always preferred over candidates who challenge them in party primaries" and endorsed candidates "may or may not prevail in primary elections." The fortuity that, due to alphabetical placement, one candidate was aligned with incumbents and party-endorsed candidates, while the other was not, did not warrant judicial intervention.

The way a candidate is identified on the ballot came before the Minnesota Supreme Court in Clifford v. Hoppe, 357 N.W. 2d 98 (1984), in which an aspirant for Congress sought to be identified on the ballot with the middle name of "Pro Life." The Court upheld the decision of the secretary of state that the candidate could not appear on the ballot in that form under Minn. Stat. ¤ 204B.25, which requires that the name on the ballot must be the legal name or nickname by which a candidate is generally and commonly known, but cannot identify the candidate in a way that "gives the candidate advantage" over an opponent. Since the name "Pro Life" on the ballot might give a candidate "an unfair advantage over opponents, the designation is not allowable. Nor is it allowed as "nickname" because it was not a name by which the candidate was "generally and commonly known," but rather "a statement of [the candidate's] position on a particular issue."

An effort to knock a candidate for the Legislature off the ballot on grounds that he was not a resident of the district was rejected in Parsons v. Hickey, 543 N.W. 2d 739 (1972). Under Article 4, ¤ 25 of the state constitution, members of the House of Representatives and state Senate must be residents of the districts that they seek to represent "six months immediately preceding the election." The challenged candidate was caught up in "delay and the consequent uncertainty" about where the district boundaries would lie after prolonged litigation regarding reapportionment. The candidate was in a "dilemma" because his home was outside of the bulk of the district he formerly represented. He then moved within the newly constructed district. Under the circumstances, the candidate "did all that was reasonably possible to establish a residence" in the district and was entitled to appear on the ballot as the candidate from that district.

An earlier effort to remove a candidate for Congress from the ballot on grounds that the attempt to place him on the ballot by petition lacked a requisite number of signatories who were registered to vote failed in Eastwood v. Donovan, 259 Minn. 43, 105 N.W. 2d, (Minn. 1960). The issue was whether the signatures on a petition seeking to place the candidate on the ballot for Congress had to be registered voters or simply members of the electorate in the district. The Court held that the signatories need not be registered voters since "an elector may or may not exercise his [sic] right to vote by registering, where it is required, but he is nonetheless an elector whether he exercises his right to vote or not."

A statutory effort to ban a candidate from running for office violated the Fair Campaign Practices Act and was deemed unconstitutional in Pavlek v. Growe, 284 N.W. 2d 174 (1979). A member of the House of Representatives was excluded from office because of violations of the Fair Campaign Practices Act, leading to passage of a statute barring a candidate running for office if the individual had won an election that was later set aside due to campaign improprieties. The remedy for such campaign violation is "to annul the election," but there is "no need or authority" for barring the candidate from any future election. The attempt to exclude a candidate because of Fair Campaign Practices Act offenses violates Article VII, ¤6 of the state constitution, which sets the exclusive qualifications for a legislative candidate to 21 years of age and prior residence within the district. The Legislature "cannot legislate an additional qualification for office not specified by the Constitution." Therefore, the excluded candidate was entitled to placement on the ballot for the new election.

The way ballots are cast has been addressed in a variety of Minnesota cases. In Bell v. Gannaway, 303 Minn. 346, 227 N.W. 2d 797 (Minn. 1975), a single vote separated the candidates in an election for a township supervisor in a Washington County community. An ensuing lawsuit focused on the validity of seven ballots, one of which contained two 'X' marks on each side of one candidate's name. The Court rejected the contention that the ballot was defective because it violated Minn. Stat. ¤ 204.22(k), which invalidates ballots that are marked in such a distinguishing way that the "voter intended to identify his ballot."

Noting the desire to "give effect as to the intention of the voter," the Court held that there was insufficient evidence to show that the voter intended to "identify his [sic] ballot intentionally," and it should be counted. Challenges to the absentee ballots of a serviceman and his wife also were rejected, as were challenges to four ballots on the grounds that they were cast by individuals who were not legal residents of the community. Delving into the issue of residency, the Court concluded that the Washington County District Court had adequately determined that they were "residents of the township for voting purposes."

The most significant challenge pertained to an absentee ballot, which was "clearly invalid" because the voter did not sign the certificate on the back of the return envelope and did not have the ballot witnessed, as required by law. Although the law requires "strict compliance" with statutory requirements for absentee ballots, the Court ratified the vote because the challenge "came too late." The ballot should have been contested before it was deposited by the election judges in the ballot box, as required by Minn. Stat. ¤ 204.11 subd. 4. Consequently, the "invalid" vote counted, which sustained the one-vote margin, a result that a dissenting judge characterized as undermining "the integrity of the electoral process."

The issue of "distinguishing marks" on ballots also was raised, but rejected, as grounds to overturn an election outcome in Fitzgerald v. Morlock, 264 Minn. 520, 120 N.W. 2d 339 (1963). The Court reviewed Minn. Stat. ¤ 204.11 subd. 3, which disqualified any vote containing a mark on a ballot intended as a means of identifying the voter. The purpose of the provision is to safeguard the "privilege of secrecy . . . [which is] regarded as a distinguishing feature of ballot voting."

The Court considered a number of different ballot markings, including words "adjacent to one candidate's name," an oval mark on the upper left corner of the ballot, a "heavily penciled line" in a space on the ballot, different forms of cross marks on the same ballot, and a number of other inconsistencies and imperfections. After a ballot-by-ballot examination, the Court reduced the spread between the parties from 14 votes to 10 votes, but upheld the electoral winner, subject to "final resolution in the state House of Representatives."

The effect of various markings on ballots also was at issue in Murray v. Floyd, 216 Minn. 269, 11 N.W. 2d 780 (Minn. 1943), which concerned a hotly contested election for county commissioner in St. Louis County. The lawsuit was brought by a write-in challenger who ran in the general election as a "sticker" candidate, in that his supporters passed out different kinds of stickers bearing his name to be affixed to the ballot.

After losing, the "sticker" challenger contested the election based on 93 votes that he contended should either have been counted for him or were erroneously counted for the opponent. Most of the challenged ballots contained a wide variety of markings, such as double cross marks, erasures, retracings, underlining and indications of changed markings "as if the voters started to mark and then changed his [sic] mind," indecent drawings, and markings on the back of ballots. This plethora of insignia were challenged as the type of "distinguishing marks" aimed at identifying the particular votes, which is proscribed under Minnesota law. Drawing from prior case law, the Court held that the "indecent drawing constituted the type of distinguishing mark" that warrants rejecting the ballot.

As to the other markings, the Court noted that a "large number of voters in some respects marked the ballots irregularly, carelessly, and ignorantly." But those votes should be counted if they "indicate clearly that the voter intended to mark such name, and the vote shall be counted as so intended." A variety of misspellings of the name of the write-in candidate also were properly rejected for a number of reasons, including major spelling errors and misidentification of the first name of the candidate. When the dust cleared, four votes were taken from the prevailing candidate and six added to the contestant, still leaving a 42-vote deficit for the "sticker" challenger, who lost his contest.

These cases reflect the conundrums that have arisen in Minnesota election jurisprudence over the years. While they pale in significance to the Bush v. Gore battle, they reflect that, as the French say, "Le plus la chose, le plus la meme," which translates, when speaking Minnesotan, to: the more things change, the more they remain the same.

Given the propensity of politicians to resort to the courts to address electoral issues, before, during, and after the ballots are cast, it's likely there will be more of the same in the future of Minnesota jurisprudence.

"[1962 gubernatorial election] irregularities included localities where more votes were counted than registered voters existed, miscues with absentee ballots, and dubious votes for a marginal third-party candidate."