Official Publication of the Minnesota State Bar Association


Vol. 61, No. 7 | August 2004
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Cousins Considered: Cases, Codes & Common Law

In an era when family values and valuing families are touted in the political arena, it seems only appropriate to consider the legal contours of consanguinity.

Marshall H. Tanick and Andrew E. Tanick

The law is often practiced as a family affair, ranging from members of close-knit family units to more distant kinfolk.  Extending past married couples, parents, children, and siblings, a surprising amount of Minnesota statutory and case law addresses issues involving cousins.

Most litigants and lawyers, including the authors, have cousins of one kind or another.  Therefore, they ought to pay heed to the law’s treatment of these interesting relationships.

COUSINS CODIFIED

A number of Minnesota statutes have codified the common law regarding cousins.  For instance, unlike states that make easy targets for late night TV comedians, Minnesota does not allow sexual relations or marriage between cousins.  Specifically, Minnesota statutes prohibit “sexual intercourse with another nearer of kin to the action than first cousins,” and further prohibit marriages between an uncle and niece, aunt and nephew, “or between first cousins.”  Minn. Stat §§609.365; 5l7.03(a)(3).  But, as with most codifications, an exception exists:  cousins may marry in Minnesota if such practice is part of the “established customs of aboriginal cultures,” a solace for the many aborigines who reside in our diverse state.

Cousins may lawfully marry in many other states, and not just where hillbillies congregate to drink their moonshine.  When these cousins legally tie the knot, their marriage is considered valid in Minnesota, although that approval is no guarantee that the kissing cousins will live happily ever after.  In McGough v. McGough, 249 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 1977), for example, two first cousins legally married in Connecticut and then moved to Minnesota.  Unfortunately, a protracted divorce ensued, which centered on the husband’s lucrative business.  The husband’s five children from his first marriage, who, coincidentally, were the second wife’s cousins once removed, further complicated the divorce.  Eventually, the Supreme Court upheld the generous settlement awarded to the cousin/wife, ordered the husband to repay money she had given to him to invest, and gave her a life estate in the husband’s 80-acre farm and all the personal property located there.

Cousins also fall within the ambit of federal statutes.  Under 28 U.S.C. §458, a person cannot be appointed to a federal judgeship if he or she is related to any other judge of the same tribunal “by affinity or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin.”  Naturally, an exception exists:  the prohibition does not apply to the U.S. Supreme Court, which therefore could be packed with nine members of the same family, first cousins included.

CONTESTING COUSINS

Cousins occasionally challenge one another in other types of legal proceedings as well.  These inter-cousin imbroglios run the gamut, but generally arise in contests over inheritances.

In re Hartz’s Estate, 237 Minn. 313, 54 N.W.2d 784 (1952), featured four cousins who challenged the execution of their elderly cousin’s will.  The elderly man had never married and his cousins were his closest living relatives.  However, the decedent’s will short-changed the cousins, and purported to leave most of the estate to his caregiver.  Asserting undue influence, the contesting cousins challenged both the probate court’s decision to uphold the will and the trial court’s order denying the contestants’ motion for amended findings or a new trial.  The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, finding the trial court erred by not considering certain extrajudicial statements of the caregiver as substantive evidence

A woman who claimed to be the sole heir to her deceased cousin challenged the handling of the decedent’s estate in In re William’s Estate, 254 Minn. 272, 95 N.W.2d 91 (1959).  The Supreme Court ruled that the cousin-claimant had a sufficient interest in the decedent’s estate, as his cousin and sole heir, to obtain a hearing on any account connected with the estate under Minn. Stat. §525.581. 

A woman who convinced her dying cousin to make her the joint accountholder on the cousin’s bank accounts, which held $125,000, spurred legal action by three other covetous cousins in In re Estate of Nordorf, 364 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. App. 1985).  The appellate court lambasted the deathbed documentation, deeming the cousin who secured the money to have breached a fiduciary duty by failing to disclose her intentions to the incapacitated decedent.  Holding the transaction invalid, the Court of Appeals ruled that the accounts belonged to the decedent’s estate.

COUSIN CULPRITS

In addition to their decidedly uncivil conduct in civil cases, cousins occasionally become jurors, defendants or conspirators in criminal cases.  Some of those interesting adventures have made it into the annals of Minnesota law as well.

In State v Hanson, 286 Minn. 317, 176 N.W2d 607 (1970) the Court held that a criminal defendant convicted of the second-degree murder of his wife was not entitled to a new trial on the grounds that one of the jurors was the local sheriff’s cousin.  Neither that relationship nor the fact that another juror was remotely related to the sheriff by marriage justified setting aside the conviction.  The Supreme Court reasoned, “the right to eliminate these jurors through a challenge for cause or by exercise of a peremptory challenge was not exercised.  To say now that the makeup of the jury voided the trial is not persuasive.”

In another case, a man was convicted of murdering his wife after she correctly accused him of having an affair with his cousin’s wife.  The defendant in State v. Schuen, 578 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 1998) managed to secure a remand of his conviction for further hearing, because of error by the trial judge.  The defendant had been shackled with a leg restraint at trial, and he claimed that the imposition prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury.  The Supreme Court held that the judge’s failure to state on the record the reason for requiring the restraint warranted a remand and hearing to determine whether the jury was aware of, and influenced by, the restraint.

In Barnes v. Doimire, 251 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2001), a defendant challenged his drug-dealing conviction, claiming the informant actually identified the defendant’s cousin, who had previously sold drugs using the defendant’s name, rather than identifying the defendant.  The defendant requested the disclosure of the informant’s identity so that he could contact the informant and prove the informant had mistaken the defendant for his cousin.  The 8th Circuit upheld the conviction, however, holding that the disclosure of the informant’s identity was immaterial and unnecessary, and therefore, the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion was not “objectively unreasonable.”

In Joiner v Wyrick. 591 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1979), a man who was convicted of murder contested the admissibility of statements he and his cousin had made while they were together in police custody.  The 8th Circuit found that the appellant had failed to object to the trial court’s determination that he had adopted his cousin’s statements as his own, and further held that the appellant could not have been prejudiced by the admission of his cousin’s statements, because those statements were almost identical to his own, which had been properly admitted into evidence.

Inconsistent defenses by a pair of codefendant cousins warranted reversal of their convictions for second-degree murder in Santiago v. State, 644 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 2002).  Here, the cousins’ trials were joined despite their opposition.  On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in denying the cousins’ severance motions.  Considering the potential prejudice to each defendant resulting from a joint trial, the Court found that the presence of antagonistic defenses constituted substantial prejudice to the defendants.  The Court therefore reversed and remanded the case.

In Smith v, State, 596 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. App. 1999), a man who wrote a letter to his cousin in which he boasted about a murder he committed was indicted for second-degree murder and entered a guilty plea.  Over five years later, while the defendant was still incarcerated, the trial court allowed him to withdraw his plea and ordered a trial.  On an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the defendant’s actions met the statutory definition of second-degree murder, and that in light of numerous circumstances, including his confession to his cousin, it was not “manifestly unjust” to uphold his guilty plea..

Finally, in State v. Witucki, 420 N.W.2d 217 (Minn. App. 1988), the court upheld the defendant’s conviction for third-degree assault against his cousin.  The cousins had encountered each other at a gas station, where the defendant accused the victim of owing him money.  The defendant then raised his fist and advised his cousin, as relatives so often do, “If I hit you, your head would be mush.”  The cousins locked fingers, and when they separated, the defendant twisted his hand and “popped” his cousin’s finger.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the victim’s injuries arose from nothing more than “an altercation between two cousins; a domestic dispute if you will.”  The appellate court affirmed the assault conviction, holding that the defendant’s “contention this is a trivial altercation between two cousins is irrelevant.”  The court also rejected the defendant’s arguments that he lacked the requisite intent for an assault conviction. 

COUSIN CULPABILITY

Those who try to take advantage of their cousins are subject to both criminal and civil culpability.  In U.S. v. Millder, 459 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1972), the court upheld the tax evasion conviction of a defendant who stole money from his wealthy cousin’s business.  Ironically, the cousin hired the defendant to perform accounting services.  His conviction was cinched when he later stated that he was jealous of his cousin’s prosperity and wanted to undermine his success.  The 8th Circuit affirmed the conviction, reasoning that even though the defendant didn’t embezzle the money for his personal use, and in fact had kept all the stolen money intact, he could still be convicted for failing to report it as income on his tax returns.

In Remileh v. INS, 101 F.3d 66 ( 8th Cir. 1996), an immigrant used his cousin’s birth certificate and Social Security number to obtain employment at a Minnesota amusement park, but neither the INS nor the court were amused.  The 8th Circuit affirmed the ruling of fraud and rejected the defendant’s argument that he adopted his cousin’s identity only to protect himself from the Hamas fundamentalist group.  To the contrary, the court held that the defendant’s “reason for showing the altered birth certificate to his employer was to verify his eligibility to work.”

An employee told his boss that he missed work to attend his cousin’s funeral in Larson v. Koch Refining Co., 920 F. Supp. 1000 (D.Minn. 1996).  Unfortunately for the employee, but fortunately for his cousin, the cousin was alive and well, and when the employer made that discovery, it terminated the plaintiff’s employment for that and other reasons.  Granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment, the court rejected the employee’s claim that his actions arose from alcoholism and therefore were protected by the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 

COUSINS CONCLUSION

If it seems like the law is laden with litigation by, between, or concerning cousins, think again.  Obviously, there are many lawsuits between extended family members that do not involve cousins.  However, even when the parties to the action aren’t blood relatives, the case may still involve cousins.  In Cousin v. Cousin, 192 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1951), for example, the plaintiff was the son of the decedent and the defendant was the decedent’s second wife.  This relationship resulted in both parties (and the decedent) sharing the name Cousin, although they weren’t.  Mr. Cousin sued Mrs. Cousin, claiming she forged the decedent Cousin’s will, which left plaintiff Cousin only $1.00.  The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge’s directed verdict and remanded the case for trial, holding that whether the will was genuine or a forgery constituted a genuine issue of material fact. 

It is not known whether these Cousins were “relatively” happy with the court’s decision.


MARSHAL H. TANICK is an attorney with the law firm of Mansfield, Tanick & Cohen, PA, in Minneapolis-St. Paul.  ANDREW E. TANICK is the chair of the Labor & Employment Practice Group at Rider Bennett, LLP in Minneapolis.  Both lecture and write extensively about a variety of legal issues with emphasis on employment law.  They are also first cousins.  They have litigated against each other in one civil lawsuit, which they both claim to have won.