Official Publication of the Minnesota State Bar Association


Vol. 62, No. 4 | April 2005
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The Guessing Game of Petition for Review
By Marshall H. Tanick

The difficulty of a litigant convincing the Minnesota Supreme Court to accept an appeal from the Court of Appeals is well-known.  Specifically, it happens roughly 15 percent of the time.  But it is even harder to figure out why the Court accepts a few particular cases for further review and declines the bulk of the others.

The obscurity of the decision-making process makes it sheer guess-work to gauge the probability of having the Court review a case.  This uncertainty creates frustration for lawyers trying to explain to clients the prospects for success of a Petition for Review by the Supreme Court, why the Court refused to accept the petition or, for that matter, why it chose to accept it.

The agony of engaging in a guessing game could be ameliorated by some modest efforts by the tribunal to articulate the process and explain the sparse, even somewhat conflicting, provisions of the applicable appellate procedural rules.

SOME STATISTICS

A glance at some statistics that frame the predicament offers insight into the quagmire faced by lawyers seeking Supreme Court review of rulings of the Court of Appeals. 

Apart from some special categories of cases, such as first-degree murder convictions and workers’ compensation cases, for which Supreme Court review is mandatory, the tribunal has unlimited discretion to decide what cases to take.  But it exercises that authority sparingly.

Over the three years 2001-2003, 2,025 petitions for review were filed, representing nearly one-third of the 6,667 cases decided by the Court of Appeals.  But only 15 percent — 315 petitions — were granted, and the number is shrinking. 

In 2001, the Supreme Court granted 119 petitions for further review, which represented 17 percent of the 699 filed.   In 2002, 646 petitions were filed, and only 112 — again 17 percent — of the cases made it to the high court for review.  In 2003, only 68 — 10 percent — of the 680 petitions for further review were granted. 

The Supreme Court reviews civil cases more frequently than other types of proceedings.  Over the three years in question, the top three categories of cases petitioned for Supreme Court review were civil, criminal, and family cases, with 783, 895, and 175 petitions respectively.  The high court granted about 21 percent of the petitions in all civil cases and in family court matters and only 12.52 percent of the petitions in criminal case proceedings.

While acceptance of a petition for review is rare, one consequence of being anointed is a high probability of reversal or modification.  In the past five years, the Court reversed or modified 62 percent of the cases for which it granted review. It reversed, or partially reversed, 57 percent of the criminal decisions it reviewed in 2003.  That same year, the Court reversed or partially reversed 66 percent of the civil decisions it reviewed.

ALTERNATIVE AVENUES

Some cases other than first-degree murder and workers’ compensation matters reach the high court directly in other ways.  For example, the Court has original jurisdiction over some cases involving politics, such as election matters.1

The federal district court may also direct certified questions of state law to the state Supreme Court, as U.S. District Court Judge John Tunheim did recently when he asked the Court, in Kahn v. Griffin, to answer whether “the Minnesota Constitution provides greater protection to the right to vote than does the United States Constitution such that failure to hold prompt elections following decennial redistricting violates (a) the Minnesota Constitution or (b) state election laws?” 2

Cases that are interlocutory in nature, but are deemed to raise “doubtful” and “important” issues, may be heard by the Supreme Court, although those cases generally pass through the appellate court first, under Rule 103.03 of Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.3  In rare cases, the Court may allow lower court rulings to bypass the appellate court for accelerated review by the top tribunal under Rule 118.4  The Court also has broad “discretionary” authority under the catch-all provision of Rule 105, which allows discretionary review of cases that are not otherwise appealable, although those cases are also generally heard first by the intermediate appellate court.

RULE REQUIREMENTS

Rule 117 of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure establishes the framework for the bulk of cases that are brought to the attention of the Supreme Court.  It provides a set of criteria required to be considered by the high court, not all of which are internally consistent.  Under the rule, the Court, in exercising its discretionary review, may consider:

  • (a) whether the question presented is an important one upon which the Supreme Court should rule; or
  • (b) whether the Court of Appeals has ruled on the constitutionality of a statute; or
  • (c) whether the lower courts have so far departed from the accepted and usual course of justice as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court’s advisory powers; or
  • (d) whether a decision by the Supreme Court will help develop, clarify, or harmonize the law; and

  • (1) the case calls for the application of a new principle or policy; or
  • (2) the resolution of the question presented has possible statewide impact; or
  • (3) the question is likely to recur unless resolved by the Supreme Court.

Addressing these many criteria creates a quandary for appellate advocates.  A case that raises novel issues would seem to be ripe for review.  But an issue that is idiosyncratic may not have the broad implications that warrant devotion of resources at the Supreme Court level, as contemplated by criteria (d)(2) and (3).  Appellate advocates, therefore, may sometimes be torn between emphasizing the peculiar, or even unique, features of the case in order to catch the Court’s attention and focusing upon the recurrent nature of the dispute and the desirability of the Court’s providing guidance on issues of ongoing concern

GUIDANCE GLIMMER

Apart from the provisions of Rule 117, the law provides very little guidance to practitioners or petitioners for review.  Rules have been in effect for 20 years, since inception of the intermediate appellate court.  Yet, in those two decades, the high court has not once articulated what considerations it applies in determining which cases are worthy of review.

This reticence is not a necessary element of appellate litigation.  In the Minnesota Supreme Court, three or more of the seven members of the court must concur before a Petition for Review is granted.5  The United States Supreme Court follows the “Rule of Four,” which requires that four of the nine justices concur before a Writ of Certiorari will be granted.6  For both the Minnesota Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, the number of judges required to grant review is discretionary, and these procedural rules are subject to change by the courts at any time.7

On occasion, individual justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in dissent offer comments on why a case that has been turned down for review should have been accepted, thereby offering a bit of guidance to lower courts, lawyers, and litigants.8  But in Minnesota, there is nary a word from the justices explaining their reasons for accepting or declining review.  The Supreme Court does not explain officially why review has been declined, and individual jurists do not offer their particular viewpoint.  As a result, Minnesota lawyers and litigants are left to guess which cases are likely subjects of Supreme Court review, and which are not.

This vacuum of guidance would be minimized if, every once in a while, the Court was to explain why a case has been granted or denied review by having individual judges remark on the Court’s decision.  Doing so could help lawyers better estimate the likelihood of achieving Supreme Court review, and so provide better advice to their clients in this regard. 

Without such guidance, lawyers will have to continue guessing whether their cases will be reviewed.  Justice is ill-served when the outcome or perception rests on chance.  By taking the “chance” to articulate why cases, or least some of them, are accepted or denied review, the Court could reduce the factor of chance in appellate practice.

NOTES
1. Minn. Stat. Ann §204B.44; Page v. Carlson, 488 N.W.2d 274 (Minn. 1992); Clifford v. Hoppe, 357 N.W.2d 2198 (Minn. 1984); State ex rel. Palmer v. Perpich, 182 N.W.2d 182 (Minn. 1971).

2. Kahn v. Griffin, 2004 WL 1635846, at *10 (D. Minn. July 20, 2004).

3. See e.g. Hallas v. Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc., 541 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Minn. App. 1995). 

4. See e.g. Thorson v. Rice County District One Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1989); Seventy-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Carlson, 472 N.W. 99 (Minn. 1991); State by Humphrey v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554 (Minn. 1992). 

5. 3 Minn. Prac. Series Appellate Rules Ann. Appendix D. Case Dispositional Procedures of the Supreme Court (2004 ed.).

6. See Harris v. Penn. Railroad. Co., 80 S.Ct. 22, 25 (1959); see also Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. §4004.2 (Juris. 2d 2004).

7. See 28 U.S.C.A. Pt. V, Ch. 131 §§2071, 2072; see also Minn. Stat. Ann. §480.05. 

8. See Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Salazar, 124 S.Ct. 2228 (2004) (denied because the issues surrounding the separation of power in state government raise no federal constitutional issues); see also Cargill, Inc. v. U.S., 116 S.Ct. 407 (1995) (denied based on factual deficiencies in the record even though constitutional questions may have existed).

The author thanks Adam Brown, a law clerk with the firm, for assisting with this article. 


MARSHALL H. TANICK is an attorney with Mansfield, Tanick & Cohen, PA, located in Minneapolis-St. Paul.  He is a graduate of Stanford Law School, and frequently practices in federal and appellate courts in Minnesota as well as in the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals.