Official Publication of the Minnesota State Bar Association


Vol. 62, No. 4 | April 2005
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Transacting the Information Marketplace:
Infringement is Easy, and Easily Avoided

Law firms and other employers who have assumed ready access to information means they need not worry about copyright should think again and take steps to
protect their interests.

by Daniel W. McDonald and Gregory W. Jackson

Mention carbon paper in the presence of a long-time copyright attorney and you may catch a wistful gaze passing over his or her face. The explosion of copying technologies over the last 30 years, starting with the Xerox machine and expanding to embrace all manner of means for moving and reproducing information, has added complexity to the field unimagined by earlier generations. Counsel today can no longer afford the luxury of a wistful response; the response of artists, authors, publishers and their counsel to today’s copying technologies has been anything but sanguine.

As threats to their interests have grown, copyright holders have fought back, and have been helped by courts and Congress in reaffirming their rights.  While the ease of copying information lulled many individuals and companies into the belief that they could copy and use others’ work with impunity, case law regarding copyrights is catching up with modern copying tools. Moreover, just as technology has made copying and infringing easier, technology tools are becoming available to make copyright compliance — and enforcement — easier. As a result, corporations that continue to neglect copyright compliance issues are taking risks that may cost millions of dollars.

Copyright law vests the copyright owner with the exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute copies of copyrighted works.1 However, understanding what constitutes illegal reproduction or distribution, and where a protected copyrighted work begins and ends, is often difficult.  For example, what many believe is allowed as a “fair use” of copyrighted works actually constitutes infringement.  Recent case decisions have solidified the protection of works, regardless of the medium in which they are originally transcribed or copied.  Modern methods of copying, including photocopying and electronic copying, are limited under the fair use doctrine and the copying prohibition in general.

Statutory changes have also helped copyright law keep up with technology.  For instance, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 19982 clarifies and extends copyright protection of works made available in digital form online or over the Internet.  In recognition of the increasing ease with which infringement can occur with modern technology, the Act increases penalties for infringement to $1 million.

Cases of Infringement

Recent cases illustrate how copyrights under 17 U.S.C. have been interpreted by courts in the context of technology advances, including what constitutes illegal reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works.  For example, electronic transmission of copyrighted text, from the memory of one computer into the memory of another, constitutes illegal reproduction and distribution.  In Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc.,3 the court held that defendant Legg Mason was liable for infringement in the amount of $20 million for permitting their one subscription to plaintiff Lowry’s market-trend-analysis newsletter to be distributed electronically company-wide. Legg Mason’s illegal activities included faxing copies to satellite offices, posting the report on the Legg Mason intranet, and emailing the report to each member of the research department.

Lowry’s was notified of this distribution by a disgruntled Legg Mason employee.  Lowry’s notified Legg Mason that the activities constituted infringement.  Legg Mason continued the illegal activities and was held vicariously liable for copyright infringement due to its failure to supervise employees, notwithstanding the company policy against such infringement.  The court also rejected Legg Mason’s argument that copying via email was fair use because the reports were copied in full and used for business-related activities.

Lowry’s actual damages were calculated around $6.5 million. However, the jury awarded Legg Mason just under $20 million for statutory damages and damages for willful infringement.  The jury award was upheld because there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Legg Mason’s employees’ conduct was “unreasonable and in bad faith.”4  The court did not require that statutory damages be strictly related to actual injury and determined that the punitive damages were not “grossly excessive.”

The Lowry case indicates that copyright infringement extends to activities that involve the electronic reproduction of an entire work and that the penalty for such infringement can be severe.  However, as the following discussion indicates, the entire work does not need to be copied for the activity to be illegal.  Sometimes systematic copying of portions of a copyrighted work constitutes illegal copying.

A Part Can Be Plenty

In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,5 defendant Texaco was found liable for copyright infringement for photocopying and circulating single licensed copies of trade journals and publications in-house to all employees.  Texaco was enjoined from continuing such activity. The court held that the fair use defense under 17 U.S.C. §107, which permits unlicensed copying for the purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research did not apply. Texaco argued the copying was fair use because it was for research purposes and was limited to in-house copying. The court disagreed and held that the purpose of Texaco’s copying was to create duplicate copies of the publication being circulated by the library, and that commercial exploitation such as this did not constitute fair use.  Texaco’s circulation policy encouraged institutional and systematic copying directed toward the goal of increasing the number of copies available to employees without paying the necessary license fees for additional subscriptions. Texaco ultimately settled out of court for an undisclosed seven-figure amount.

Interestingly, the Texaco court found copyright infringement of the entire publication even though only individual articles were being copied.  Moreover, the writers of the journal articles did not receive any financial reward from having their articles included in the publications. Therefore, the holding in Texaco was based on the premise that the selection of articles and presentation of them was the protected interest of the publishers, and the scope of copyright protection extended to maintaining those articles in their original display within the journal. The direct photocopying of even a single article resulted in the impermissible reproduction of a portion of the entire work and a violation of the copyright belonging to the entire journal.

Electronic Media Also Covered

Copyright protection for published articles covers not only photocopying, but also extends to protect against their reproduction and dissemination in other media.  The Copyright Act protects works in their original form, and does not permit copying and pasting substantial parts of a work from its original form to a different version.  In New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini,6 the plaintiffs were freelance authors who contributed articles to the New York Times newspaper that were subsequently redistributed to companies such as LEXIS/NEXIS without permission. The authors sued the newspaper publisher for submitting their articles to the electronic content providers for inclusion in an online computerized database and CD-ROM products. The court held that the articles taken together, as printed in the New York Times, constituted a collective work, but the rights to each article vested in the author of the particular contribution.  The court stated that “if there is demand for a freelance article standing alone or in a new collection, the Copyright Act allows the freelancer to benefit from that demand.”  In other words, a freelance author has rights in the portion of the collective work to which they contributed.

The New York Times argued the LEXIS/NEXIS database and CD-ROMs were merely revisions of a collective work, and that the authors retained no rights regarding such revisions. The Copyright Act allows owners of a collective work to redistribute the constituent parts as a revision of that collective work.7  The court rejected this claim, concluding that a revision authorized under the original grant of rights by the freelance authors must “preserve some significant original aspect” of the underlying collective work.  In Tasini, the court held that the electronic versions of the articles were not a mere “revision” of the original collective work (i.e. the newspaper).  The court noted that the articles were not displayed as they originally were published in the printed version of the New York Times.  Moreover, only certain articles were chosen for reproduction in the electronic databases. The court refused to allow the publisher to circumvent §201(c) of the Copyright Act by offering the articles for individual sale through computer databases.  Because the chosen articles were not displayed in the same context as they were when first published in the New York Times, distributing the articles electronically was an infringement of the freelance authors’ rights.

Tasini clarifies that copyright protection extends to creative works regardless of the medium in which they are subsequently copied, electronic or otherwise.  Authors of works displayed in collective works have rights in their creations outside the scope of the collective work in which those creations are initially presented.  A publisher seeking to separate and include an article from a collective work in a database must first obtain a license conveying electronic rights in the article from the author.

Risks and Costs

The three cases discussed in this article clarify that, while unauthorized copying and distribution can and does happen in the context of activities made easy and cheap by modern technology, that activity may nevertheless infringe copyrights.  According to the court in Texaco, photocopying parts of a copyrighted publication can constitute infringement.  The ruling in Tasini prohibits the copying of selections from collective works and displaying them in other media, such as online or in an electronic database, without permission.  The court in Lowry’s prohibited the unauthorized selection and distribution of an entire publication via email or on an internal Intranet.  These courts found infringement in activities that some might see as de minimus copying, acceptable internal copying, or an allowable or “fair” use of something that the defendant already had rights to use.  Clearly, such assumptions can no longer be so easily held.

Furthermore, the repercussions that infringers face can be dramatic.  As the hefty damages award in the Lowry case demonstrates, refusing to purchase another copy of the publication is not worth the potential liability for copyright infringement.  If an infringer is found liable, the owner of a copyrighted work may elect to recover either actual damages, the infringer’s profits, or statutory damages.  Statutory damages can range between $750 and $30,000 per act and may be increased to $150,000 per act if the act is “willful.”8  The same technology that makes it easy to make a single copy enables easy production of multiple copies of multiple works.  Such multiple infringements multiply the damages exposure as well.

Alternatives to Infringement

These dangers can be avoided by taking simple steps. For instance, Legg Mason could have avoided liability by purchasing the correct number of licenses to use Lowry’s reports at a price that was a mere fraction of the damages award. The New York Times could have obtained permission from the individual authors to resell their articles by contract.

End users can also protect themselves by making arrangements in advance to cover their intended use of copyrighted material. Many law firms and corporations have research staff or librarians who handle the task of obtaining clearance for the use of content.  Firms can secure particular publication “feeds” to direct selected information onto their corporate intranets.  When rights to individual works are needed for research or advertising purposes, these can be separately requested.  But these approaches can be time-consuming.

Another alternative is to utilize a licensing firm. Copyright Clearance Center (CCC, online at copyright.com) provides bulk photocopy licenses for its catalog of publishers.   Subscribers to the CCC system can reference the catalog to determine if coverage is available for any particular publication. More recently, Valeo IP (valeoip.com) has developed an online tool that utilizes “tags” embedded in digital documents to tell enterprise licensees whether the content they are viewing is covered by the Valeo ip license package.  Both CCC and Valeo IP also facilitate “one off” transactions for their respective publishers.

The path of innovation in respect to copyrights thus seems to be coming full circle.  Having first appeared in the form of technologies that made infringement almost frighteningly easy, the road led on through legal developments reaffirming creators’ rights in their work and has now turned into technologies and organizational structures that enable a fair and easy commerce in the sharing of information. With appropriate attention to safeguards for others’ rights, it’s easy to reap the benefits of today’s burgeoning information marketplace.

Notes
1 17 U.S.C. §106 (2004).

2 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998).

3 Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F.Supp. 2d 737 (D. Md. 2003).

4 Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F.Supp. 2d 455 (D. Md. 2004).

5 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (2nd Cir. 1998).

6 New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).

7 17 U.S.C. §201(c) (2004). 

8 17 U.S.C. §504(c) (2004).


SIDEBAR INFORMATION:

Risky Assumptions About Copyright

  • Assumption: “Copyright protection is too limited in scope to be of much relevance to employee activities.”  Fact: Copyright protection covers many works that employees encounter daily.
  • Assumption: “If one is not copying a work in the traditional sense, one is not infringing another’s rights.”  Fact: Infringement is deceptively easy, and can involve electronic as well as paper copies.
  • Assumption: “Tasks easily accomplished through email and the Internet would not be so simple and commonplace if they had potential to infringe copyrights.” Fact:  Case law and statutes are evolving to meet the challenges of email and the Internet.
  • Assumption: “Damages for copyright infringement are so minimal that being wrong doesn’t matter.”  Fact:  Costs can be substantial.
  • Assumption: “Copyright owners lack the ability to catch an infringer, or at least enforcement is too unwieldy to be practical.”  Fact:  Just as technology enabled widespread copying of information, it’s evolved to simplify enforcement of copyrights and the licensing of limited rights to those who want them.

The authors express their appreciation to Jeff Brown and Heather Kliebenstein, associate attorneys at Merchant & Gould, PC, for their assistance in preparing this article.


DANIEL W. McDONALD is a shareholder at Merchant & Gould, PC, where he litigates copyright and other intellectual property cases.  He is a graduate of the University of Minnesota Law School.


GREGORY W. JACKSON is the vice president and general counsel for Taylor Corporation and CEO of Valeo Intellectual Property, Inc. He is a graduate of the University of Minnesota Law School.