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40
Years of 8th Circuit Jurisprudence: He
was nominated for a newly created seat on the appellate tribunal by
President Lyndon B. Johnson and confirmed on October 20, 1966, after
a distinguished career as a lawyer in Duluth and also serving as a
member of the University of Minnesota Board of Regents, along with numerous other civic
activities. Judge Heaney is one of eight Minnesotans who have served
on the 8th Circuit. Three currently remain on that tribunal: Judge
Donald Lay, who also joined the tribunal in 1966, Judge Diana Murphy,
a former federal district court judge and, before that, a Hennepin
County district court jurist, who has been on the 8th Circuit since
1994, and Judge James Loken, who has served
on the 8th Circuit since 1990, and as chief judge since 2003. A
native of Goodhue, Minnesota, Judge Heaney was an active jurist on
the 8th Circuit for 22 years, until he took senior status at the beginning
of 1989. However, he remained quite active in that capacity, continuing
to carry out his duties, until he officially stepped down at the end
of August 2006 at age 88, completing his long tenure. During
his four decades on the bench, he authored hundreds of opinions for
the court, along with occasional concurrences and dissents. A short
retrospective of his career cannot do him the type of justice that
he furnished to litigants and lawyers coming before him during his
four decades on the bench. But here’s a synopsis of a few of the more
notable cases highlighting his 40 years of service on the 8th Circuit. Supreme Situations A
number of situations that Judge Heaney faced on the bench ultimately
reached the Supreme Court. Several of his opinions were upheld, including
some dissents, while others were overturned by the high court. One
of his rulings confirmed by the Supreme Court was a landmark Commerce
Clause case, Consolidated Freightways
Corp. of Delaware v. Kassel, 612 F.2d
1064 (8th Cir. 1979), aff’d
450 U.S. 662 (1981). The case
was a challenge by a motor carrier to an Iowa law that barred
use of particularly long trucks on interstate highways in that state.
Because of the limitation, the carrier was required either to divert
some shipments around the state or to shuttle them across the state
using multiple vehicles. Judge
Heaney found that the law impermissibly burdened interstate commerce
under Article I, §8 of the Constitution. The state’s justification
for the law, enhancing highway safety, was “illusory” and not supported
by the evidence in the record, despite the Iowa Legislature’s determination
to the contrary. While “some burdening of interstate commerce will
be tolerated,” to advance safety interests, the Iowa measure was violative
of the interstate commerce clause because it both “burdens interstate
commerce and fails to directly protect a state safety interest.” The
Supreme Court affirmed, in a plurality opinion written by Justice
Lewis Powell, agreeing substantially with Judge Heaney’s
reasoning. It explained that “the incantation of a purpose to promote
the public health or safety does not insulate a state law from Commerce
Clause attack,” concluding that the restriction was defective because
it furthered safety marginally, while interfering substantially with
interstate transportation. The high court ruling endorsing Judge Heaney’s
reasoning is considered a leading Commerce Clause case, often reprinted
in law school textbooks. He
also was affirmed in an education case, holding in Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir.
1981), aff’d sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, that a state university could not bar student
religious organizations from using public facilities for worship and
religious teaching. Because the university permitted the facilities
to be used for a variety of political, cultural, educational, social
and recreational purposes, prohibiting use for religious purposes
had the impermissible primary effect of inhibiting religion,
“clearly hinder[ing] the constitutional
rights” of the religious adherents. The
Supreme Court agreed, by a margin of 8-1, in a decision written, again,
by Justice Powell. He concurred with Judge Heaney that the school’s
policy “offended the 1st Amendment right of freedom of religion.” Judge
Heaney also was overturned in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260 (1988), another education-related case. Writing for the appellate
court, he held that a public school principal could not remove from
a high school newspaper two pages that he felt unduly impinged on
the privacy rights of pregnant students. 795 F.2d
1368 (8th Cir. 1986). But the Supreme Court reversed, reasoning
that because the school newspaper did not constitute a “public forum,”
school officials could impose “reasonable restrictions” on the contents
of the newspaper. It upheld the right of the principal. Another
ruling by Judge Heaney, which was affirmed by his own 8th Circuit,
was later reversed by the Supreme Court in Smith
v. Arkansas State Highway Employees Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
Sitting by designation as a federal trial judge in Arkansas, Judge
Heaney held that a state agency’s refusal to allow unions to pursue
grievances on behalf of members in the absence of a written complaint
submitted by a union member to management violated the union’s 1st
Amendment right to pursue a grievance on behalf of its members. 459
F. Supp. 452 (1978). The
8th Circuit affirmed, 585 F. 2d 876 (1978), before the Supreme Court,
in a 7-1 ruling, reversed. It held that the agency’s refusal to permit
a union to pursue a grievance, without a written complaint from a
member, does not “prohibit or discourage union membership or association”;
rather, its conduct “is simply to ignore the union,” which the state
government “is free to do.” Justice Thurgood Marshall, a sole dissenter, agreed with Judge Heaney
and lamented that the Court “so cavalierly disposed of the substantial
1st Amendment issues.” Another
trial court decision authored by Judge Heaney regarding labor unions
and 1st Amendment rights also was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges
v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984). Writing for a three-judge panel,
acting as a trial court under then-existing procedures, Judge Heaney
found the “meet and confer” provision of the Minnesota Public Employment
Labor Relations Act (PELRA), Minn. Stat. §179.61, unconstitutionally
infringed on the 1st Amendment rights of nonunion faculty members
at state colleges, requiring the school administrators to engage in
official discussions only with the faculty’s union. 571
F. Supp. 1 (1982). But
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the statute did not infringe upon any 1st Amendment rights of faculty
members who were not represented by unions, nor did it violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The high court reasoned
that the measure does not violate any “[c]onstitutional
right [of faculty] to force the government to listen to their views”
because they do not have any “such right as members of the public,
as government employees, or as instructors in an institution of higher
education.” Constitutional
Conundrums Judge
Heaney addressed a number of other constitutional conundrums that
did not reach the Supreme Court level. In
another education-related case, Pratt
v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d
771 (8th Cir. 1982), he upheld the ruling of District Court Judge
Miles Lord in Minnesota enjoining the Forest Lake School District
from prohibiting the showing of a movie entitled “The Lottery” to
students after parental complaints about the content of the film caused
the school board to withdraw it from circulation. Although the movie,
which was an allegory about bigotry, was “not a comforting film,”
Judge Heaney declared that “students had a fundamental 1st Amendment
right … to be exposed to controversial ideas” and the school authorities
did not establish a “substantial governmental interest for interfering
with the students’ right to receive [such] information.”
One
of his significant constitutional decisions arose outside of the 1st
Amendment in Geiger v. City
of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980). In this case Judge Heaney
ruled that a city ordinance in Eagan prohibiting the “possession,
sale, transfer or display for sale or transfer” of drug-related devices
was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment. The definition of “drug-related devices” in the ordinance
was so vague, conflicting, and not susceptible to common understanding
that it did not “provide notice to the ordinary person of what is
prohibited” and also impermissibly failed to “provide standards to
law enforcement officials to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” Judge
Heaney addressed a constitutional conflict between the provisions
of the Social Security Act and the Railroad Retirement Act in Yost v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 438 (8th Cir.
1983). The claimant had been collecting divorced spouse benefits under
the Social Security Act based upon the work record of her husband,
who was fully covered under both that measure and the Railroad Retirement
Act. After her exhusband remarried, and then died, his second wife began
receiving survivor’s benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act. The
Social Security Administration decided that the former divorced spouse
was no longer eligible for benefits under the Social Security Act
because §202(l) of that act provided that if “any person” is entitled
to survivor’s benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act, then no
survivor’s benefits shall be paid to “any person” on the basis of
the earnings of an employee insured under both acts. Her ineligibility prompted a class-action challenge
to the operation of this provision under the Equal Protection and
Due Process clauses. Judge
Heaney disagreed, upholding the agency’s determination and dismissing
the case. Although “struck by the unfairness of the operation of the
statute,” he felt its inequity “does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation” because the statute “advances the legitimate goal of preventing
dual payment of survivor’s benefits on the basis of the same wage-earner’s
record.” Criminal
Cases Judge
Heaney authored numerous decisions regarding criminal law matters
during his 40 years on the bench. He
reached different conclusions in a pair of privacy-related cases.
In United States v. Barry, 853 F.2d 1479 (8th
Cir. 1988), he affirmed a decision of U.S. District Court Judge Paul
Magnuson of Minnesota, suppressing stolen goods found in a warrantless
search of a suitcase in a locker at the Twin Cities airport. Agreeing
with the lower court, he determined that the owner of the luggage
had a “reasonable expectation under the 4th Amendment of privacy”
that proscribed searching the seized suitcase without a warrant. But
Judge Heaney rejected a privacy claim in United
States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1983), upholding a man’s
conviction under a state sodomy statute. He rebuffed claims of equal
protection and violation of the right to privacy for the incident
that occurred in a public rest room at a national park. Applying “judicial
self-restraint,” he found that no “[c]onstitutional
right to privacy extends to ... oral sex in a public restroom within
the confines of a national park.” The decision preceded the ruling
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
which upheld a state sodomy law, and Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which overruled Bowers with respect to private homosexual conduct between consenting
adults. He
also addressed the rights of prisoners. In Salaam
v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1990), he held that a prison
policy refusing to allow an inmate, following his conversion to Islam,
to use a religious name on his records, clothing, and for mail constituted
an unconstitutional restriction on the prisoner’s 1st Amendment rights
because the spiritual importance of the new name outweighed the “minimal”
burden that would be required to update prison records. He
also struck down the state’s refusal to let an inmate’s son visit
him in prison, where the son was on the institution’s approved visitor
list, in Taylor v. Armontrout,
894 F.2d 961 (8th Cir. 1990). The list created a “liberty interest”
protected under the 14th Amendment. One
of Judge Heaney’s most significant, and
notable, criminal rulings upheld the cause célèbre conviction of Leonard
Peltier. United States v. Peltier, 800 F. 2d 772
(8th Cir. 1986). The Native American activist was convicted
of murdering two FBI agents in connection with tensions on the Pine
Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota. Following remand, the 8th
Circuit, in a decision written by Judge Heaney, held that the withholding
by the government of favorable evidence that may have assisted in
the cross-examination of certain government witnesses did not create
a reasonable probability of acquittal and, thus, did not warrant a
new trial. Although he accepted that favorable evidence had been withheld
that “would have allowed [the defendant] to cross-examine certain
government witnesses more effectively,” he concluded that the evidence
was not “material in the sense that its nondisclosure undermines confidence
in the outcome of the trial.” Judge Heaney’s
examination of the evidence led him to conclude that, while there
was a “possibility that the jury would have acquitted” had the improperly
withheld evidence been available to the defendant, under prevailing
law Peltier was unable to meet the standard for a new trial that
“the jury probably would
have reached a different result,” which warranted denial of the appeal.
Five
years later, Judge Heaney, who also was on the panel on Peltier’s
earlier appeal, 731 F. 2d 550 (8th Cir. 1984), wrote a letter supporting
the president’s authority “to commute or otherwise mitigate the [life]
sentence” imposed in the case. He pointed out several improprieties
in the way the case was handled, ranging from the way the government
“over-reacted at Wounded Knee” to “improper tactics” used by the prosecution.
Calling for the government to “treat Native Americans more fairly,”
he called for a “healing process,” but no presidential action has
been taken in the 20 years since Judge Heaney’s post-conviction call for “[f]avorable
action” on behalf of the convicted Native American activist. Another
aspect of the Wounded Knee fracas came before Judge Heaney in a civil
context in Price v. Viking Penguin,
Inc., 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), in which he affirmed the
dismissal of a libel action brought by an FBI agent against a book
that criticized FBI actions during the incident. Writing for a unanimous
panel, Judge Heaney affirmed a ruling of U.S. District Court Judge
Diana Murphy dismissing the case. He held that the FBI agent was a
“public figure,” and that many of the defamation assertions he made
were either legally protected opinion, privileged statements made
in judicial proceedings, or otherwise fell short of the high standard
of “clear and convincing evidence” that the materials were published
with the knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth,
as required under the New York Times v. Sullivan standard for
“public” officials and figures. Judge Heaney explained that while
it is “difficult to write about controversial events without getting
into some controversy … the Constitution requires more speech than
less” in order to avoid “the damage done to every American when a
book is pulled from a shelf … or when an idea is not circulated.”
In
United States v. Bird, 287
F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2002), he ruled that the 6th Amendment right to
counsel attaches following arraignment in tribal court. Because an
arraignment constitutes an “adversarial judicial proceeding,” subsequent
statements extracted from a defendant in a rape case without the presence
of counsel had to be suppressed because of the 6th Amendment infraction. He
also ruled upon the rights of those who help put people in prison
— police officers. In Otten v. Schicker,
655 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1981), he upheld a police department regulation
prohibiting employees from running for elective office. The prohibition
was not violative of any constitutional
rights of police officers because it “serves important governmental
interests” by “guaranteeing job security free from the political arena,
and ensuring the impartial execution of the laws.” Voting Views In
another case involving Native American rights, Cottier v. City of Martin, 445 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 2006), Judge Heaney mandated
revision of voting districts in a small southwest city adjacent to
the Pine Ridge Reservation because the configuration of the city wards
diluted votes of candidates preferred by Native Americans and, thus,
constituted a probable violation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§1973(b) as well as the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of
the 14th Amendment. Based upon exit polling and results of eight consecutive
elections in which candidates preferred by Native Americans were defeated
by those largely supported by white voters, Judge Heaney sent the
case back to the trial court to determine whether voter dilution occurred
to an extent warranting new voting districts in which “Indian-preferred
candidates have a reasonable chance of prevailing.” Similar
views on voting were reflected in Perkins
v. City of West Helena, Ark., 675 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982). Judge
Heaney overturned an at-large process for electing municipal aldermen
on grounds that the arrangement was discriminatory because it limited
the opportunity of African-Americans to elect members of their race.
The gravamen was that the at-large electoral
system “prevent[ed] white aldermen from losing
their seats to black candidates.” Judge
Heaney’s outlook in the Cottier and Perkins case paralleled his approach in cases involving racial desegregation
of public schools. He was involved in a number of them, including
the longstanding litigation in St. Louis, culminating in Liddell v. Special School District, 149 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1998),
which came before the 8th Circuit for the tenth time, following a
number of trips back-and-forth between the trial and appellate courts,
with a few denials of certiorari by the Supreme Court. Writing for
the 8th Circuit following remand, Judge Heaney held that the educational
system in the St. Louis metropolitan area remained, after three decades,
racially flawed, stemming from the creation in the mid-1960s of different
vocational education systems for the city of St. Louis, which had
a large African-American population, and the suburbs, which were Caucasian-dominated.
He ordered that a single entity be the “sole provider of high school
vocational education for the city and the county,” expressing confidence
that the state would “take necessary steps to reach this goal” in
order to blot out the remnants of racial discrimination that existed
before he mounted the bench. The
issues in the Liddell litigation
were not unfamiliar to Judge Heaney. Concerns regarding desegregation
of public schools was a theme that spanned his career on the 8th Circuit,
beginning as early as his first year on the court in Kelley
v. Altheimer, Ark. Public School Dist. No.
22, 378 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1967), in which he found numerous discriminatory
policies and procedures in the operation of a school district in Arkansas. Discrimination Decisions While
in private practice for two decades in Duluth, Judge Heaney’s
primary focus was labor law. He had ample opportunity to ply that
expertise on the 8th Circuit. A
number of his decisions involving employment and labor law dealt with
discrimination claims. In Peterson
v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515 (8th Cir. 2005), he reversed the
dismissal by federal Judge Richard Kyle in Minnesota of a lawsuit
by a former county corrections officer in Scott County for alleged
discriminatory treatment on grounds that the county failed to hire
her on a full-time basis and passed her over for promotional opportunities
because of her age and sex, along with the claims of hostile environment
and reprisal. While
affirming dismissal of the hostile work environment claim, Judge Heaney
reversed on the failure to hire, failure to promote, and retaliation
claims. Because of the county’s “change in hiring process and fluid
standards for applicants, … [and] evolving explanation of its hiring decision,”
a reasonable jury could determine that the county engaged in unlawful
discrimination because of the applicant’s gender and age. There also
was sufficient evidence, although “an admittedly close case,” to warrant
a trial on the failure-to-promote claim. The employee’s assertion
of unlawful retaliation also warranted trial because there was “sufficient
evidence to permit a reasonable fact finder to determine that [the
county] retaliated against [the claimant] on the basis of her complaints
of discrimination and harassment.” Judge
Heaney also reversed another dismissal of a Minnesota discrimination
claim in Maki v. Allete, Inc.,
383 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2004). Three retired female employees claimed
that their private sector employer violated Title VII of the federal
Civil Rights Act and the parallel provision under the Minnesota Human
Rights Act by adopting a pension plan that failed to credit them for
service that had occurred prior to their terminations under old policies
that prohibited married or pregnant women from working for the employer.
U.S. District Judge Ann Montgomery dismissed the lawsuit, but Judge
Heaney reversed and reinstated the case. The
key issue related to timing. The claimants had worked for the employer
in the 1950s and 1960s, when they were terminated because of then-existing
policies prohibiting married women, and then married pregnant women,
from working at the company. The policies were eliminated before passage
of antidiscrimination laws, and the claimants were all rehired in
the 1980s. Following their retirements, they began collecting pension
benefits, but they claimed that they should have been credited with
pension payments for the time period that they were not working due
to discriminatory policies. Judge Heaney held that they had actionable
claims, rejecting the employer’s contention that imposing liability
under Title VII would constitute a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws since the federal measure was
not enacted until many years after the women had been terminated.
The claimants were not seeking “retroactive application of Title VII,”
but alleged that provisions of the pension plan, which were adopted
after Title VII was enacted, discriminated against them in not allowing
them to bridge the time that they were off work for pension purposes.
The matter was remanded to Judge Montgomery to sort out whether the
claims were barred by any applicable statutory time periods. Judge
Heaney also reversed a pair of lower court rulings regarding equal
pay for women. In Schultz v.
American Can Company-Dixie Products, 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970),
a 20-cent wage differential between women machine operators on day
shifts and men on night shifts violated the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.
§206(d)(1). Although there were some slight differences in the work
performed on the different shifts, the difference in pay between men
and women was not the product of any bona fide job classification system. Rather,
all the jobs were “equal” for purposes of the statute and the pay
disparities constituted an unlawful discrimination based on gender.
Similarly,
in Katz v. School Dist. of Clayton,
Mo., 557 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1977), Judge Heaney held that a female
assistant teacher was not deprived of her rights of equal pay when
she was not paid the same as two full-time middle school teachers
when her job was “equal in skill, effort, and responsibility” to that
of the male counterparts. He agreed with the district court that,
during her first year of employment, she did not have a viable claim
under the Equal Pay Act because she often performed clerical duties
and did not spend the majority of her time teaching. But in the ensuing
year, although her duties mirrored those of the male teachers, she
was not paid as much as they “with the knowledge and acquiescence”
of the school district. Although the “job titles of [the] employees
are not the same,” the actual duties that they were performing were
similar, which warranted a determination of liability under the statute. In
another labor-related case, during his first year on the bench, Judge
Heaney upheld a determination by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), requiring an employer to pay Christmas bonuses to employees
in the labor union after the employer had previously unilaterally
discontinued payment of bonuses to employees in the bargaining unit
in American Fire Apparatus Company
v. National Labor Relations Board, 380 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1967).
Although the employer had not committed any other unfair labor practices
and calculation of the bonuses for 15 employees would be “difficult,
if not impossible,” the NLRB correctly determined that the company
violated the collective bargaining agreement by unilaterally withholding
bonuses that had previously been paid. Although the amount is subject
to “some discretion” by the company, the bonuses must be paid in some
amount, subject to review by the Board. Dissenting
Decisions Judge
Heaney’s views did not always convince his
circuit court colleagues, which prompted him to dissent in some significant
cases. In
Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co.,
960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1993), he dissented from the decision
that a provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which overruled
a decision of the Supreme Court barring failure-to-promote claims
under 42 U.S.C. §1981, does not apply retroactively to a case that
was pending on appeal when the law was enacted. The case was brought
by an African-American former employee of a newspaper who claimed
that the employer denied promotion due to her race. The majority,
in a decision written by Judge James Loken
of Minnesota, held that the statute of limitations does not apply
retroactively, which drew the dissent of Judge Heaney. He thought
the majority decision “strains the bounds of credible statutory interpretation”
and was “disingenuous” in concluding that the act was intended to
“operate only prospectively.” But
Judge Heaney was eventually vindicated in another discrimination case
dissent in Minnesota in U. S.
Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F. 2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983) rev’d sub nom. Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) in which the 8th Circuit
majority held that the Jaycees had a 1st Amendment right to bar women,
despite a provision in the Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibiting
discrimination based on gender in “places of public accommodation.”
At the district court level, Judge Murphy upheld the application of
the law to the Jaycees, which the majority reversed. In
dissenting from the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc, Judge Heaney wrote that barring women from the “primarily
business-oriented” organization had the deleterious “effect … to deprive
[them] of an equal opportunity for leadership positions” in the business
world. His position was eventually adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court,
which unanimously held that the 1st Amendment did not override the
state’s prohibition of gender discrimination in public accommodations.
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). A pair of his other dissents in high-profile litigation, however, were not subject to later approval
by the high court. In Perpich v. U.S. Department
of Defense, 880 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1989), the 8th Circuit en banc rejected the claim of Minnesota
Governor Rudy Perpich challenging a federal
law restricting the power of state governors to withhold consent to
federal deployment of the National Guard. The majority held that the
measure was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s exclusive power
of control over the military, a view that Judge Heaney felt “cannot
be right” because it “contradicts the clear intent of the founding
fathers … [and] ignores the unambiguous language of the Constitution,”
which gives “state control” over deployment of the National Guard
under a pair of clauses in Article 1, §8 of the Constitution. He
also vigorously dissented in a capital punishment case, Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003) cert. denied 540 U.S. 832 (2003), which
held that the 8th Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment and the Due Process clauses do not prohibit the use of
forced medication to restore competency to a prisoner as a precursor
to the imposition of capital punishment. The claimant, who had been
convicted of capital felony murder, asserted that forcibly using an
antipsychotic drug to remedy his mental illness in order to allow
the state of Arkansas to execute him was impermissible. The majority
rejected his contention and ordered the execution to go forward. But
Judge Heaney objected, asserting his belief that executing someone
“who was severely deranged without treatment and arguably incompetent
when treated” constitutes a form of “mindless vengeance.” Circuit Conclusion These
cases represent only a small taste of Judge Heaney’s
work in his four decades of service on the 8th Circuit. They do, however,
reflect the flavor of his jurisprudence. For
his four decades of service, he is owed a debt of gratitude by lawyers
and litigants throughout Minnesota, the 8th Circuit, and other jurisdictions
as well. MARSHALL H. TANICK is an attorney with the law firm
of Mansfield, Tanick & Cohen, P.A.,
in Minneapolis and St. Paul. He is certified as a Civil Trial Specialist
by the Minnesota State Bar Association (MSBA) and represents employers
and employees in a variety of workplace-related matters. He wishes
to thank Brock Specht, a law clerk with the firm, for his assistance in preparing
this article. |
